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 Cyclical and institutional determinants of
 annual trade union growth and decline
 in Ireland: evidence from the DUES data series
 WILLIAM K. ROCHE AND JOE LARRAGY
 ABSTRACT Attempts to apply the influential Bain-Elsheikh model to annual trade union growth and decline
 in Ireland have produced puzzling results. This paper rejects existing interpretations of such results by
 economists and offers an alternative explanation which is theoretically and empirically more satisfactory. While
 strong evidence is found that variations in labour market slackness affect opportunity to unionize, there is no
 evidence that they directly affect employees' or employers' dispositions towards unionization. The paper
 establishes that the peculiarities of labour market and institutional structure and development in Ireland
 provide a severe test of models developed on the basis of the experience of the major Western nations.
 INTRODUCTION
 Since the early 1980s trade unions in Ireland
 have experienced a sharp decline in member-
 ship. Between 1980 and 1985 in the region of
 51,000 members were lost. In fact the recent
 decline in membership has been so dramatic and
 sustained that it represents the most serious
 setback experienced by Irish unions since the
 1920s. Figures l(a) and l(b) present the trend in
 aggregate union membership and inter-year
 rates of growth and decline since the early 1930s.
 While it appears from the graphs that Irish
 unions have tended to decline in periods of
 recession and to recover in periods of economic
 buoyancy, the figures beg more questions than
 they resolve. What aspects of economic
 buoyancy or recession are most important in
 influencing the trend of union growth and
 decline? In what manner do economic trends
 influence employees' decisions regarding
 whether they should join a trade union or
 remain unionized? How closely is the trend of
 unionization in any year related to the state of
 the economy, given that membership growth
 rates recorded during the 1960s and 1970s seem
 relatively modest considering the unprecedented
 economic prosperity enjoyed by Ireland for
 much of this period? Have other factors, not
 related in any direct way to economic activity,
 also influenced the trend of unionization?
 ANNUAL VARIATIONS IN TRADE UNION
 GROWTH AND DECLINE
 In recent years much debate and research on
 short-run union membership growth, and
 specifically on its relationship to the economic or
 business cycle, has focused on the 'Bain-
 Elsheikh' model, developed in a well-known
 study of union growth in four countries (Bain
 and Elsheikh, 1976). Drawing heavily, if
 critically, on earlier historical and econometric
 work on the determinants of union growth, Bain
 and Elsheikh develop and estimate the following
 theoretical model:
 AMt = Po + PlAWt + 232APt + I3Ut +
 P4Dt-1 + Et  (1)
 where AMt, the inter-year proportionate rate of
 change in trade union growth is a linear effect of
 AWt, the inter-year rate of change in money
 wages, APt, the annual rate of price inflation,
 Ut, the level of unemployment, Dt-1, the level of
 trade union density, lagged one year (and
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 FIGURE 1 Trade union growth in Ireland
 measured as membership over all employees at
 work legally entitled to join unions plus the
 unemployed), and et, a random error term.' The
 expected signs on the coefficients are as follows:
 P1, P2 > 0 > P3, P4
 Variations in money wages are held to affect
 the degree to which potential and existing trade
 union members credit unions with success in
 negotiating pay rises. Variations in retail prices
 are believed to influenc  employees' propensity
 to nter or remain in unions through the threat
 posed to living standards. Thus, the higher the
 rate of rise in prices, other things being equal,
 the more unions are held to benefit from the
 'threat effect' o  inflation. Moreover, rising
 prices, it is argued, usually reflect business
 buoyancy, and, as such, APt also captures, a
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 'prosperity effect': that is, variations in the
 degree to which employers will possess the
 power or inclination to resist the spread of
 unionization. In times of business prosperity
 employer resistance to unionization will de-
 crease as employers become more concerned to
 avoid disruption to business and less concerned
 about the possible effect of unions on costs.
 The level and/or the rate of change in unem-
 ployment is expected to influence short-run
 changes in the rate of membership growth
 because it may affect the costs and benefits
 associated with joining a union or remaining a
 union member. Unions may provide few
 services of value to the unemployed, with the
 result that the cost of becoming or remaining a
 member if unemployed may greatly outweigh
 the benefits. In a slack labour market employers
 are also more likely to resist unionization and
 this may increase the cost of joining or remain-
 ing in benefit for those in employment. Finally,
 union growth is expected to be inversely related
 to the level of union density because, as the
 latter rises, the marginal cost to unions of re-
 cruiting additional members will increase, as
 well, possibly, as the marginal disinclination of
 remaining employees to unionize. These factors
 combine to give the so-called 'saturation effect'
 imposed by rising density on further member-
 ship growth.
 Clearly the Bain-Elsheikh basic model cannot
 claim to be a complete model of annual trade
 union growth and decline. The model is focused
 primarily on business-cycle influences which
 affect short-run variations in aggregate union
 membership. A complete aggregate-level model
 would also have to include two other major
 types of influence. It is reasonably generally
 established that the probability of being
 unionized varies in accordance with a variety of
 socio-demographic factors. For example,
 workers in large organizations tend, other things
 being equal, to be more highly unionized than
 workers in small organizations; blue-collar
 workers tend to be more highly unionized than
 white-collar workers; men tend to be more
 highly unionized than women. These factors
 aggregate into important differences in levels of
 unionization between industries. Changes in the
 distribution of the work-force across industrial
 groups w ll then affect the trend in aggregate
 uni nization, depending on the direction those
 changes take. As such, we can speak of
 aggregate st uctural influences on union growth
 and decl ne, which of their nature, tend to be
 marginal from year to year and only to become
 apparent in the long-run trend of unionization.
Fi ally, it is also apparent that a variety of
 institutional influences can affect the trend in
 union membership. Laws may be passed which
 either facilitate or hinder the organizing efforts
 of unions; the primary level at which collective
 bargaining is conducted in a country might affect
 the fortunes of unions through its effect on
 perceptions of union influence. The political
 composition of the party or parties in govern-
 ment in different periods may also influence
 unionization. Left-wing and social democratic
 governments might be expected to be broadly
 supportive of union power and influence, while
 liberal and right-wing governments are likely to
 foster and reflect a more hostile climate for
 unions.
 While the use of a density measure to capture
 the 'saturation effect' in the Bain-Elsheikh
 model, takes account of the impact of structural
 change on union membership, it does so only in
 a very rough manner. In empirical estimation,
 much of the impact of structural change is
 necessarily disguised in the constant term of the
 model. Similarly, in applications of the model to
 some countries, Bain and Elsheikh try to allow
 for what we have called institutional influences
 through the use of binary or dummy variables.
 Such effects are not theorized in any systematic
 manner.
 Such problems aside, the model produced
 satisfactory results when estimated over long
 periods for the United Kingdom (1893-1970),
 the United States (1897-1970), Australia (1907-
 1969) and Sweden (1914-1970) (Bain and
 Elsheikh, 1976: 87-115). Given the par-
 simonious character of the model and its
 apparent ability to account for annual union
 growth and decline in nations with strikingly
 different trade union traditions, there seems to
 be no reason a priori why it cannot be used
 effectively as a baseline model with which to
 explore influences on trade union growth and
 decline in Ireland.
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 TABLE 1 Trade union growth in Ireland, 1932-1984: The 'Bain-Elsheikh Model' and WSt(a)
 Equation 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
 Method OLS OLS OLS OLS CORC
 R2 0-4502* 0-4907* 0-4546* 0-6523* 0-6516*
 F 9-8275 11-3195 10-0001 22-5972 21-9735
 DW 1-71t 1-76t 1*73t 1-585 1-81t
p 0- 4
 Constant 10-1381* 12-1839* 9-8396* 10-9113* 9-9902*
 (3-627) (3-881) (5.567) (7-846) (7.579)
 AWt 0-7447* 0-7464* 0-7561* 0-6406* 0-5751*
 (5-067) (5-247) (5-259) (5-507) (5-144)
 Dt-l -0-2358* -0-2603* -0-2365* -0-2571* -0-2584*
 (-4-098) (-4-489) (-4.203) (-5-721) (-5.508)
 APt -0-5815* -0-5876* -0-5913* -0-4509* -0-4446*
 (-4-289) (-4-491) (-4-809) (-4-437) (-4-391)
 Ut -0-0384
 (-0-206)
 Ut-1 -0-1336
 (-0-639)
 AUt -0-0176
 (-0-650)
 WSt -16-7525* -16-3816*
 (-5-306) (-5-805)
 Note: (a) In this and subsequent tables, figures in brackets are (one-tailed) 't-ratios'. * denotes a coefficient which is
 significantly different from zero at the 1% level; t indicates the absence of first-order autocorrelation at the 1% level;
 and 4 indicates an inconclusive Durbin-Watson statistic.
 ESTIMATING A BASIC MODEL
 Major data problems are encountered in esti-
 mating this model in the Irish case. The steps we
 have followed to resolve these problems, par-
 ticularly as they affect the dependent variable,
 are outlined at length in another paper (Roche
 and Larragy, 1989: 5-9). Suffice it here to note
 that we have not relied on previous published
 aggregate official or union statistics but have
 instead built up new aggregates from an examin-
 ation of extant public and other records relating
 to every trade union known to have existed in
 Ireland since 1929. Given the availability of
 data, empirical estimation must be restricted to
 the period from 1930 or 1932 to 1984, depending
 on how variables are specified.
 The basic Bain-Elsheikh model is estimated
 in equations 1.1 to 1.3 of Table 1. The method of
 estimation used is ordinary least squares regres-
 sion (OLS). Where there is evidence of autocor-
 relation, or where the Durbin-Watson statistic is
 inconclusive, quations are re-estimated to
 correct for autocorrelation, using the Cochrane-
 Orcutt iterative procedure (CORC).2 It appears
 from these equations that the basic model per-
 forms less than satisfactorily. The R2s for the
 equations indicate that the model explains less
 than 50 per cent of the annual variation in union
 growth. Wage trends and the level of union
 density do appear to have the effects postulated.
 However, several of the parameters fail to regis-
 ter the effects postulated in the Bain-Elsheikh
model. Equations 1.1 to 1.3 indicate that the
 annual rate of unemployment fails to exert a
 significant effect on union growth in Ireland,
 whether introduced as a level (Ut) or as a rate of
 change (AUt), and irrespective of whether cur-
 rent or lagged values are employed. The reasons
 52
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 why there appears to be no concurrent linear
 association between the measured rate of unem-
 ployment and the rate of union growth in
 Ireland will be considered later in the paper.
 Further, all equations point to a highly signifi-
 cant negative association in the Irish case
 between inflation and union growth.3
 STAGFLATION AND POTENTIAL UNION
 MEMBERSHIP
 An examination of the estimated residuals of the
 basic model, plotted in Figure l(c), suggests a
 number of underlying problems. First, it is clear
 that a dramatic and unexpected decline in
 membership was recorded during 1941. This
 outlier obviously depresses significantly the
 goodness of fit of the model and reflects the
 impact on union growth of exceptional circum-
 stances. During 1941, the Government
 attempted to control inflation by introducing
 legislation which imposed a virtual freeze on
 wages (the Wages Standstill Order). This
 effectively hamstrung unions with regard to
 wage bargaining, and thus probably accounts in
 large measure for the dramatic fall in union
 membership. The passing of the Trade Union
 Act 1941 in the teeth of strong trade union
 opposition may also have contributed to the
 membership crisis. The Act introduced a system
 of licensing for unions and led to the atrophy or
 dissolution of a number of organizations which
 had little possibility of meeting the conditions
 necessary to qualify for a licence. It is important,
 therefore, to take account of the exceptional
 institutional circumstances of 1941 in estimating
 the model, either by excluding this year entirely,
 or by allowing for the circumstances of 1941 in
 the model by means of a binary or dummy
 variable. The latter procedure is followed in
 equations 1.4-1.5, and all subsequent equations,
 where WSt defines the relevant dummy variable.
 It is clear that allowing for the exceptional
 circumstances of that year increases the ex-
 planatory power of the basic model. Equation
 1-5, for example, which combines WSt and the
 significant variables from the three earlier
 equations, and which employs the CORC esti-
 mating procedure, accounts for some 65 per cent
 of the variance in inter-year union growth.
 While a resp ctable fit is thus achieved by
 adjusting for the exceptional circumstances of
 1941, Figure l(c) also indicates that when the
 model is fitted the residuals obtained are clus-
 tered. These clusters suggest that relevant
 explanatory variables have been omitted from
 the model and that the coefficients of the terms
 in the basic model are thereby biased and unre-
 liable. This problem has an important bearing
 on the perverse negative sign obtained on the
 price coefficient.
 The first point that has to be noted in this
 regard is that whereas Bain and Elsheikh suggest
 that inflation will usually occur in periods of
 economic prosperity, it appears that in Ireland
 the opposite has more usually been the case.
 The highest inflationary peaks recorded between
 1930 and 1984, have, in fact, occurred in periods
 of economic recession.4 Three such-stag-
 flationary-peaks are particularly striking: the
 first between 1940 and 1943 when annual
 inflation varied between 10-2 and 15-2 per cent;
 the second following the first oil crisis between
 1973 and 1977 when annual price rises varied
 between 11-4 and 20.9 per cent; and the third
 between 1979 and 1983 when inflation varied
 from 10-5 to 20.5 per cent.
 Figure 2 brings out the recessionary character
 of major inflationary peaks in Ireland since the
 1930s by plotting the annual rate of price
 changes against a measure of labour market
 slackness: the annual rate of change in the level
 of employment. Regression analysis over
 different periods of years indicated that the
 significance of APt in the basic Bain-Elsheikh
 model in fact depended on these inflationary
 peaks. In short, the conclusion must be that in
 the Irish case APt entered in the basic model
 tends to proxy-at least in part-not the pros-
 perity effect postulated by Bain and Elsheikh
 but, on the contrary, the drag imposed on union
 growth by periods of stagflation and labour
 market slackness. In such periods the pool of
 potential members available to unions is
 reduced, while employees' propensity to
 unionize may also fall in response to labour
 market slackness, as is suggested by Bain and
 Elsheikh. That the price term in the model picks
 up labour market slackness, even when an
 unemployment term is also included, points to
 53
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 FIGURE 2 The trend in inflation superimposed on the trend in employees at work, Ireland 1930-1984
 the unreliability of the latter as a measure of
 labour market slackness in the Irish case.
 It seems advisable, then, to introduce a
 potential membership variable into the model
 directly, in order to examine whether it alters
 the results on the price coefficient, affects the
 tendency for residuals to cluster and so reduces
 the risk of bias in the coefficients and of obtain-
 ing spurious results.5
 A theoretical problem that then arises, how-
 ever, is how potential trade union membership
 should be specified. One alternative is to follow
 Bain and Elsheikh by specifying potential
 membership as employees in employment plus
 the unemployed. It seems questionable that this
 represents a realistic definition of potential
 membership in the Irish (or, indeed, the British)
 case, whether viewed from the perspective of
 employees or from that of the unions which seek
 to recruit them. For what has characterized Irish
 trade unions, some recent initiatives notwith-
 standing, is a lack of concern with recruiting the
 unemployed and a concentration of organizing
 initiatives and union services on those in
 employment.
 If we accept, therefore, that the unemployed
 cannot be regarded in any significant sense as
 having formed part of the constituency or
 potential membership of Irish trade unions over
 the period covered by this study, it follows that
 the rate of change in employees at work and not
 the rate of change in the work-force should be
 used as a measure of annual changes in potential
 trade union membership. The narrower defi-
 nition of potential membership should also, of
 course, be adopted in defining trade union
 density.
 The importance of this theoretical question
 becomes clear when models are fitted incor-
 porating alternative potential membership terms
 and alternative specifications of union density.
 In the equations reported in Table 2, AEt and
 AWFt denote the annual rates of change respect-
 ively of employees in employment and the
 employee work-force; Dt-1 denotes lagged
 density defined with the employee work-force as
 54
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 TABLE 2 Trade union growth in Ireland, 1930-1984: Results of alternative specifications of changes in potential
 membership and density, combined with model estimation over different periods of years
 Equation 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
 Period 1933-84 1933-84 1930-84 1930-84
 Method OLS OLS OLS CORC
 R2 0-7990* 0-8028* 0-6976* 0.6379*
 F 29-8092 30-5379 22-6063 16-9091
 DW 2.10t 2-07t 1-58t 1-78t
 Constant 13-9291* 9-8828* 7-7850* 6-5060*
 (7-745) (5-685) (5-875) (5-038)
 AWt 0-6668* 0.4166* 0-3826* 0.3531*
 (4-651) (4-034) (3-242) (2-969)
 Dt-l -0-2598*
 (-7-055)
 DEt-1 -0.2033* -0.1723* -0-1732*
 (-5-988) (-4-402) (-3-901)
 AWFt 0-6668*
 (4-651)
 AEt 0-7550* 0-7824* 0.6608*
 (4-800) (4.349) (3-351)
 APt -0.2763* -0.2633* -0-1752 -0-1733
 (-2-906) (-2-759) (-1-729) (-1.551)
 Ut -0-2958* -0-0089
 (-2.419) (-0-078)
 WSt -15-9834* -16-4015* -15-9993* -15-7322*
 (-6-360) (-6-63 (-(-5435) (-5.812)
 * \ }~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..
 denominator, and DEt-1 denotes lagged density
 defined, with employees at work as denomi-
 nator.6 Given the data available, models incor-
 porating Dt-1 and AWFt specifications of density
 and changing potential membership terms can
 be fitted only to data for the period 1933-84.
 Equations 2.1 and 2.2 of Table 2 present the
 results of models incorporating alternative
 specifications of changing potential membership
 and density covering the period 1933-84. It is
 clear that both potential membership terms and
 both density specifications are significant and
 correctly signed. APt remains significant at the
 99 per cent level irrespective of the manner in
 which these variables are specified. The
 inclusion of AWFt and AEt in the model
 increases the overall goodness of fit, though
 neither specification is markedly superior in this
 respect. The Durbin-Watson statistics approach
 2-0, indicating that the level of autocorrelation
 among the residuals has been reduced. The
 weak and insignificant coefficient on the unem-
 ployment term in equati ns 2.1 and 2.2 under-
 lines the lack of a concurrent linear relationship
 between union growth and the measured level of
 unemployment in Ireland.
 In models including AEt and DEt-1, the sig-
 nificance of APt is found to be very dependent
 on the cases or years included in the regressions.
 When models including these terms-and o it-
 ting the insignificant unemployment term-are
 fitt d over the periods 1932-84, 1931-84, or
 1930-84, APt fails to reach significance at the
 chos n confidence level. The significance of
 other terms is unaffected by the addition or
 exclusion of these cases.7 Equation 2.3 fits a
 model which includes AEt and DEt-1, but
 excludes the insignificant unemployment term,
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 over the period 1930-84. And equation 2.4
 estimates the same model adjusting for the
 possibility of autocorrelation. It is clear from
 both sets of results that the overall explanatory
 power of the model declines when 1930-32 is
 included in model estimation. It is also clear that
 the only coefficient which becomes insignificant
 is APt.
 An important conclusion can be drawn from
 these findings. The effect of changes in price
 levels on the rate of change in union member-
 ship is very much less consistent than the effect
 of the other variables that have been shown to
 influence the annual rate of unionization over
 the period since 1930. In other words, the
 significant 't ratio' on the price term of equation
 2.2 cannot be accepted uncritically as indicating
 that rises in the price level have generally or
 reasonably consistently, and in broadly linear
 manner, exerted a drag on the rate of union
 growth in Ireland. Rather, it must be concluded
 that an analysis of the properties of the price
 coefficient suggests that the price effect evident
 in equations 2.1 and 2.2 is something of a
 statistical artifact which is highly sensitive to the
 cases included in model estimation.
 While the actual effect of prices on the rate of
 union growth between 1930-84 is thus revealed
 as erratic and, in this sense, insignificant, it has
 to be recognized at the same time that the years
 1931 and 1932 represent 'outliers' in the re-
 lationship between the price trend and the rate
 of union growth.8 Yet there seems no good
 reason to exclude these outlying years from
 model estimation; on the contrary, a theoretical
 reason can indeed be given for their inclusion.
 The period 1930-32 was unique in the overall
 period 1930-84 in that it represented a period of
 deflationary recession. Looked at over the
 longer-run, these years were the tail-end of a
 deflationary slump which extended back to the
 early 1920s.
 From the data available on trends in union
 membership during the 1920s, it is clear that the
 level of unionization fell drastically. If data were
 available to include this earlier period in model
 estimation, it is therefore very probable that the
 results obtained would further undermine the
 negative price effect on union growth apparent
 in tests of the Bain-Elsheikh model and
 equation 2.2. Furthermore, anticipating a theme
 to be developed next, when a dummy variable is
 included in our respecified model to take
 account of the cluster of positive residuals
 between 1946 52, APt loses significance if we
 drop cases and test the model, for example, over
 1934-84 or 1935-84. This provides further evi-
 dence for the inconsistency of the effect of
 changing prices on the level of unionization.
 It can be concluded, therefore, that changes in
 the price level have not had a consistent linear
 effect on the rate of union growth in Ireland
 since 1930, and that this can be attributed at
 least in part to the recessionary character of
 periods of highest inflation in Ireland. Any
 increased propensity towards unionization there
 may have been in times of high inflation would
 thus have been counterbalanced by growing
 labour market slackness during these periods.9
 This of course still assumes that Irish employees
 hav  reasonably consistently turned towards
un ons through a 'threat effect' in periods of
 high inflation. As will be seen later in the paper,
 there is in fact no evidence to support such an
 effect in the Irish case. The finding also still
 leaves open the important theoretical question
  the manner in which variations in labour
 market conditions affect union growth and
 decline. It may simply be that periods of
 buoyancy and recession influence union growth
through their effect on levels of employment and
 thus on the pool of potential union members.
 Bain and Elsheikh propose that the business
 cycle also, and more interestingly, affects
 employees' propensity to unionize through its
 effect on employer and employee behaviour: in
 times of prosperity employers adopt a softer
 stance towards unions and employees have less
 reason to fear that union membership will have
 negative consequences. Before giving further
 consideration to these important questions, it is
 first necessary to deal with further institutional
 complexities that arise in the Irish case.
 THE TRANSITION FROM WAGE CONTROL
 TO FREE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
 Figure l(c) shows that the estimated residuals
 hat arise from fitting the basic model contain a
 cluster of positive values for the period from the
 56
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 mid-1940s to the early 1950s, significant in mag-
 nitude, if somewhat erratic in trend. This
 indicates that the model tends to under-predict
 union growth for this period because it omits
 factors which had an important effect on
 employees' propensity or opportunity to
 unionize during the immediate post-war years. It
 seems to us that the principle of these factors can
 be identified and their effects accounted for.
 However, they are not related to the business
 cycle in any meaningful sense, and must instead
 be understood in terms of the effects on early
 post-war unionization of the manner in which
 the Irish economy was managed during wartime.
 The wage freeze introduced during 1941 was
 replaced by a wage tribunal system in April of
 the following year. While wage rises were per-
 missible under this system, the tribunals
 moderated the trend in pay and held increases
 below the rate of inflation. A sharp acceleration
 in the rate of inflation during the War thus
 imposed a sharp squeeze on real wages. It
 appears that the system of wartime wage control
 had significant direct and indirect effects on the
 rate of trade union growth subsequent to its
 abolition and the return to free collective
 bargaining in 1946. Specifically, we would dis-
 tinguish between three related effects of the
 system of wage control in operation between
 April 1941 and August 1946. First, the sharp
 general squeeze on real wages, which resulted
 from pay rises throughout the labour market
 lagging behind the rate of inflation, was respon-
 sible for the build up of generalized pressure for
 the restoration of pre-war living standards.10
 Secondly, the abolition of wage control in
 August 1946 had the effect of synchronizing
 wage pressure throughout the trade union
 movement.
 These factors combined to trigger 'rounds' of
 synchronized wage bargaining, or pay rounds, as
 they were to become known. The advent of pay
 rounds represented a fundamental change in the
 manner in which wages were negotiated in Irish
 industrial relations. The early post-war rounds
 probably heightened significantly the 'credit
 effect' from which unions gain and hold
 members in that they gave union involvement in
 wage bargaining a degree of transparency not
 before attained. Finally, the removal of wage
 control also led to the establishment in 1946 of
 the Labour Court. The Court was to play an
 mportant role in institutionalizing pay rounds
 and also set about encouraging union recog-
 ition in sectors where employers had refused to
 countenance negotiations with trade unions.
 During its early years the proceedings of the
 Court were widely reported in the media,
 further enhancing the public profile unions were
 enjoying on the basis of their involvement in pay
 rounds. It is the combined effect of these devel-
 opments, we would suggest, which explains in
 major degree the cluster of positive residuals for
 the post-war period evident in Figure l(c).
 The three strands in our explanation for
 dramatic union growth in the early post-war
 period cannot, however, be disentangled to
 allow estimation of their separate effects, as
 would be preferable. Nor, relatedly, can they be
 subsumed in any meaningful sense to the logic of
 the Bain-Elsheikh model. Bain and Elsheikh as
 we saw, seek to account for union growth in
 terms of the relatively straightforward current or
 recent effects of continuous economic variables.
 The situation which existed in the period follow-
 ing the abolition of wage control seems to us an
 example of a phase of significant economic and
 social discontinuity in the labour market, in
 which economic, social and institutional devel-
opments become, so to speak, convoluted and
 combine to produce rather unique effects."1
 Drawing on our own earlier work, a group of
 researchers at Harvard have attempted to incor-
 porate what we call the transition effect into a
 comprehensive multi-dimensional scale of Irish
 collective labour law; this is introduced into
 u ion growth models as a variable (see Pelletier,
 1988). Elsewhere, we have presented a detailed
 theoretical and empirical critique of the scale
 (Roche and Larragy, 1989: 50-55). The method
 we use to e timate the 'transition effect' conse-
 quent on the shift from the wartime economy to
 normal labour market conditions is again to
 introduce a dummy variable. While the starting
 year of the transition effect values of this vari-
 able can then be specified as 1946, a problem
 arises regarding how we are to identify the
 terminating year. It would clearly be preferable
 if it could be determined a priori on theoretical
 grounds. Yet given the complexity of the effects
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 TABLE 3 Trade union growth in Ireland, 1930-1984: the 'transition effect' dummy, alternative indicators of competitiveness,
 and price trends in periods of 'low' and 'high' unemployment
 Equation 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
 Period 1930-84 1930-84 1930-84 1930-84 1932-84
 Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
 R2 0-7867* 0-7875* 0-7874* 0-7875* 0-8315*
 F 29-5118 24-8929 24-8708 24-8842 31-721
 DW 1-82t 1-84t 1-84t 1-84t 2-12t
 Constant 6-0726* 5-9215* 5-9013* 5-7845* 7-0451*
 (5-114) (4-744) (4-132) (4-178) (5-979)
 AWl 0-2718* 0-2777* 0-2758* 0-2746* 0-2950*
 (2-636) (2-647) (2-638) (2-634) (3-024)
 DEt-1 -0-1347* -0-1360* -0-1325* -0-1313* -0-1512*
 (-4-006) (-3-876) (-3-664) (-3-561) (-4-691)
 AEt 0-8320* 0-8431* 0-8434* 0-8451* 0-8277*
 (5-437) (5-388) (5-367) (5-364) (5-638)
 APt -0-0978 -0-1158 -0-1144 -0-1147
 (-11(-183)115) (-1-183) (-165) (-178)
 WSt -15.7018* -15.5187* -15.5217* -15.5112* -15-7752*
 (-6-284) (-6-072) (-6-056) (-6-054) (-6-914)
 T 4-4694* 4-5520* 4-5662* 4-5825* 4-0036*
 (4-479) (4-443) (4-404) (4-394) (4-303)
 Clt 0-0791
 (0-430)
 C2t 0-1319
 (0-390)
 C3t 0-1512
 (0-415)
 APGt -0-1406
 (-1-264)
 APSt -1-1539
 (-1-839)
 it is used to measure, this hardly seems possible.
 The termination year of t e transition effect
 dummy (T) was set t 1952 on the basis o  an
 examination of the cluster of residuals evident in
 Figure l(c).12 As is evident from equation 3.1 of
 Table 3, the inclusion of the dummy raises the
 explanatory power of the model and further
 reduces the effect and significance of APt. The
 R2 rises to 0-79 and an F test confirms that the
 addition of T raises the explanatory power of the
 model significantly.13
 The results are consistent, therefore, with the
 proposition that a significant transition effect
 accelerated trade union growth between 1946
 and the early 1950s. Consistent with these find-
 ings, we will use equation 3.1 as a basis for
 extending our analysis of the determinants of
 Irish trade union growth in sections that follow.
 COMPETITIVENESS AND IRISH UNION
 GROWTH: THE 'SAPSFORD THESIS'
 We have argued that the significant negative
 price effect obtained by fitting the Bain-
 Elsheikh model to Irish data is spurious. It is
 important, nonetheless, to consider explicitly an
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 explanation for this unexpected result advanced
 by Sapsford (1983; 1984) on the basis of his
 research into Irish trade union growth over the
 period 1944-77. Sapsford begins by noting the
 'very pronounced tendency' for the Irish rate of
 price inflation to exceed that of the United
 Kingdom. This being the case, he argues, the
 resistance of Irish employers to unionization
 stiffens in periods of inflation due to concern
 that increased unionization will intensify 'wage
 push' and result in a deterioration in Ireland's
 competitiveness vis-a-vis its main trading part-
 ner (Sapsford, 1984; 311-312). An important
 implication of this argument is that APt is proxy-
 ing trends in competitiveness in addition
 to-and to a greater degree than-the 'threat'
 and 'prosperity' effects postulated by Bain and
 Elsheikh. If this is so, and competitiveness rela-
 tive to the UK could be measured more directly,
 then such an influence on Irish trade union
 growth might be confirmed. In that case, by
 allowing directly for such an effect, the remain-
 ing APt variable might indeed measure more
 reliably whether Irish trade union growth has
 been affected by 'threat' and 'prosperity' effects.
 The argument advanced by Sapsford-whether
 restricted to union growth during the period
 1944-77-or extended to Irish trade union
 growth generally, as seems to be intended-
 appears to us unconvincing for economic and
 industrial relations reasons.
 To begin with, during one of the periods of
 highest inflation experienced in the Irish
 economy, the early 1940s, little competitive
 disadvantage could have been suffered by Irish
 employers whatever the trend in Irish and
 British inflation rates. This was so, of course,
 simply due to the restriction-or, more pre-
 cisely, atrophy-of trade resulting from wartime
 conditions. Relatedly, the tight regulation of
 wages during the same period would have
 dispelled any fears that a 'soft' stance on
 unionization might intensify wage push. Any
 fears of competitive disadvantage that might
 have arisen during the highly inflationary years
 from 1979 to 1983, on the other hand, would
 also have been countervailed to some significant
 degree by the decline in the value of the punt
 against sterling following Ireland's accession to
 the EMS in 1979.14 Thus, during two of the
 inflationary peaks recorded between 1930 and
 1984-the third spanned the period from 1973 to
 1977-economic circumstances were such as to
 dampen any fears of competitive disadvantage
 that might have arisen due to the trend in Irish
 inflation relative to the United Kingdom. As
 r g ds the remaining 'peak' in the inflation
 trend, dur ng he years after the first oil-shock, a
 rapid ac eleration in prices occurred in both
 cou tries owing to their common dependence at
 that time on imported oil.15 Furthermore, until
 after 1966, when the Anglo-Irish Free Trade
 Agreement led o the dismantling of trade
 restrictions, trade between Ireland and the
U ite  K ngdom was heavily regulated by a
 system of tariffs and quotas. The existence of an
 extensive system of import quotas in Ireland had
 the effect of shielding Irish companies in the
inte nationally traded goods sectors from the
 full rigours of competition with UK imports
 (Kennedy, 1971: 26-36; McAleese, 1971;
 McAleese and Martin, 1973).16
 Qu stions of economics aside, there is no
 general evidence from research on Irish indus-
 trial relations that employers have in fact acted
 in accordance with such a view of the dangers
 attendant on the growth of unionization during
 periods of high inflation. While admittedly such
 a  orientation might not be expected to come to
 light in any clear or coherent sense, it is often
 claimed that what has characterized Irish man-
 agement-at any rate until recently-is, in fact,
 a pervasive failure to take account of competi-
 tiveness; and this can at least be supported by
 empirical evidence and general information on
 the conduct of Irish industrial relations over
 much of the period covered by our paper.17
 Support for these theoretical propositions is
 obtained by introducing variables into the model
 to measure directly the effect of competitive
 disadvantage on the rate of union growth in
 Ireland. Consistent with Sapsford's own
 desiderata, these variables are derived from
 trends in Ireland's price level relative to the UK
 over the period from 1930 to 1984.18 As the
 share of total Irish trade accounted for by trade
 with the UK fell significantly over the period
 covered by this study, it might be expected that
 the overall significance of relative UK-Ireland
 inflation for competitiveness would also have
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 declined. To take account of the declining share
 of UK trade in total Irish trade over this period,
 we thus 'trade weighted' the measures of
 competitive disadvantage.19 Finally, having pur-
 sued a regime of parity in currency values rela-
 tive to sterling, from the foundation of the state
 to 1979, Ireland broke with sterling after joining
 the European Monetary System in that year. As
 such, relative price trends have also been
 adjusted from 1979 to allow for the effect of
 exchange rate variations between the punt and
 sterling. While this modification might be con-
 sidered to be of marginal significance, as it could
 only affect a small number of years, it has to be
 kept in mind that some of the largest-for
 Ireland, negative-divergences between Irish
 and British inflation rates occurred in the years
 between 1981 and 1983.
 The first measure of relative inflation we have
 used is the Irish (percentage) inflation rate
 minus the British, where years in which Irish
 inflation is lower than in Britain and years in
 which Irish deflation is higher are assigned a
 value of zero. (Clearly in these years Irish
 competitiveness was helped rather than en-
 dangered by relative price trends.) This variable
 (Clt) was then weighted to allow for differences
 in the share of trade with the UK in total Irish
 trade to give a second variable, C2t. This vari-
 able was in turn adjusted to allow for exchange
 rate variations since 1979 to give a third vari-
 able, C3t. Finally, three additional measures of
 relative price trends, C4t, C5t and C6t were also
 developed in the same way, but this time
 calculating the basic relative inflation variable,
 C4t, by subtracting absolute annual changes in
 the British consumer price index from changes
 in the Irish CPI. Again, also, years in which the
 trend in relative prices favoured Irish competi-
 tiveness were assigned a value of zero.20 The
 advantage of developing such a series of
 indicators is that it covers to a reasonable degree
 any objective pressures that might have arisen
 due to trends in relative inflation as well as any
 subjective attitudes that employers may have
 developed from observing relative price trends.
 Whichever of these six competitiveness vari-
 ables is introduced into the model, the results
 are similar: relative price trends have no signifi-
 cant effect on the rate of annual trade union
 growth. The coefficient on APt remains nega-
 tive, of g nerally similar magnitude as in other
 equations, and insignificant. The results
 obt ined when Clt, C2t and C3t are used are
 presented, by way of example, in equations
 3.2-3.4 of Table 3. Following the Sapsford
 hypothesis, the introduction of the C variables
 s ould have overcome a specification error in
 the equations, thus improving the efficiency and
 consistency of the estimates.
 On the basis of this evidence and the reason-
 in  pres nted above, we therefore reject the
 hypothesis that trends in Irish inflation relative
to the UK have exerted a significant effect on
Irish trade union growth.
 CYCLICAL EFFECTS ON OPPORTUNITY
 AND PROPENSITY TO UNIONIZE
 Must we conclude from the analysis presented
 thus far, in particular from the insignificance of
 the price term in models which contain a
 potential membership term and a competi-
 tiveness term, that no reasonably consistent
 'threat effect' operates on the rate of union
 growth in Ireland? It could still be countered
 that a threat effect operates on employees'
 propensity to unionize but that the coefficient of
 the usual measure of the threat effect, the APt
 term, is conflated by countervailing trends in
 labour market slackness-even when we
 attempt to neutralize the effect of such
 countervailing pressures on the price term by
 introducing AEt.
 One means of further investigating the possi-
 bility that a threat effect exists but is neutralized
 in the regressions due to measurement diffi-
 culties is to introduce separate inflationary and
 stagflationary price trend variables into the
 equation. This is done by defining a price in-
 flation variable (APGt) which takes on observed
 annual values for years in which the level of
 unemployment is less than the mean or median
 for Ireland over the period 1932-84 and which is
 assigned the value of zero for years when unem-
 ployment equals or exceeds these 'norms'.21
 Clearly, this variable will measure any threat
 effects in years of relatively low unemployment.
 A second variable is then defined (APSt) to
 measure the effects of price rises in periods of
 60
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.163 on Tue, 04 Jul 2017 16:45:03 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
 stagflation. This variable takes on normal annual
 values when the level of unemployment is
 greater than, or equal to, the mean or median
 levels of unemployment over the period studied
 and is otherwise assigned a value of zero.
 If a threat effect is operating on propensity to
 unionize, arguably it should be apparent in
 periods of prosperity when the conflating influ-
 ence of stagnation on the price trend variable is
 not present.
 The results obtained when these variables are
 introduced into the model-using the mean
 unemployment rate to distinguish between in-
 flationary and stagflationary conditions between
 1932-84-are presented in equations 3.4 and 3.5
 of Table 3.22 These results are of considerable
 interest and suggest that the Bain-Elsheikh
 proposition regarding the effects on union
 growth of APt appears invalid in the Irish
 situation, irrespective of the state of the labour
 market. The findings show no indication of a
 threat effect at low unemployment but point to a
 weak and insignificant negative price effect in
 periods of relatively low and relatively high
 unemployment.23
 This leaves us with the problem of explaining
 why the rate of price inflation appears to have
 had no significant effect on the rate of trade
 union growth in Ireland, when we control for
 variations in labour market slackness otherwise
 proxied by APt. The most plausible explanation
 is that the threat effect was institutionally
 neutralized or weakened in the Irish case. This
 may have arisen owing to the prominence, or
 even dominance, of changes in the cost of living
 in the wage policies of Irish trade unions, and
 (since 1946) in the dynamics of wage rounds.
 During the 1970s a series of national wage
 agreements strengthened the influence of the
 CPI on wage adjustment by introducing cost of
 living escalator clauses to protect the real value
 of wage rises in the face of sharply escalating
 inflation (see O'Brien, 1981). This latter devel-
 opment meant that for a significant part of the
 period with which we are concerned a high level
 of nearly automatic protection against inflation
 was provided for the majority of employees,
 whether unionized or not, through the operation
 of the wage bargaining system.24
 If basic pay levels across a wide range of
 i dustries were thus protected against inflation,
 and if this in turn became a firm expectation
 among employ es, the institutional features of
 pay d termina ion may have reduced the per-
 ceived th eat posed by rising prices for
 employe s' standard of living. In other words,
employees may have become accustomed to the
 expectation that wage levels would respond to
changes in price levels, with a concomitant
 reduction in the 'threat effect' postulated by
 Bain and Elsheikh.25
 In the same way that the existence of a
 consistent threat effect must be doubted in the
 Irish case, so too must Bain and Elsheikh's
 postulated tendency for employers' propensity
 to resist unionization and employees' confidence
 in embracing it, to vary directly with the busi-
 ness cycle. The positive coefficient on AEt may
 simply indicate that the annual rate of unioniz-
 ation varies in response to variations in oppor-
 tunity to unionize, as determined by the size of
the employed work-force. Stronger evidence is
needed if we are to be able to conclude with any
 confidence that employees' and employers' pro-
 pensities or attitudinal dispositions towards
 unionization vary in the manner hypothesized.
 On the face of it, this evidence cannot be found
 in the Irish case.
 To begin with, if propensities regarding
 unionization varied in the manner outlined by
 Bain and Elsheikh, we might expect the coef-
 ficient on AEt to be greater than unity: that is,
 we might expect the rate of union growth to
 recover more sharply than the rate of employ-
 ment growth in the upswing of the cycle and the
 opposite to occur in the downswing. But irre-
 spective of how union growth equations are
 specified, AEt consistently remains below unity.
 Further negative results are obtained when we
 introduce a profits term into the equation in an
 attempt to provide a more sensitive measure of
 variations in business buoyancy.26 Sapsford
 found that the level of real profits had a signifi-
cant effect on union growth in Ireland in the
 period 1943-77 and this finding was underscored
 by Smyth's analysis of Irish union growth over
 the period 1946-77 (Sapsford, 1984: 314-315;
 Smyth, 1985: 200-201).27 The results obtained
 when variables measuring the annual rate of
 change in money profits (AII)t and real profits
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 A(II/P)t are introduced into a model estimated
 over the period 1943-84-the period for which
 Sapsford reports positive findings-are pre-
 sented in equations 6.1 and 6.2 of Table 6 below.
 Neither variable attains significance and the
 coefficients on other terms of the model are
 virtually unaffected by their inclusion.28 Again
 the evidence is against viewing variations in
 business buoyancy as a source of changes in
 propensities with respect to unionization-
 either in the case of employees or employers.
 LABOUR MARKET INTERDEPENDENCE
 AND UNION GROWTH: THE 'SMYTH
 THESIS'
 This study has established that annual variations
 in employment, that is, in net job gains or losses,
 significantly influence the rate of trade union
 growth but that the annual level of unemploy-
 ment has no effect.
 Using Sapsford's data, Smyth (1985) con-
 cluded that there was evidence that the annual
 rate of union growth in the Irish Republic over
 the period 1946-77 was affected by the level of
 unemployment in Ireland relative to the UK.
 Smyth finds little surprise in this on theoretical
 grounds and notes that the Irish and UK labour
 markets are interdependent in significant
 respects and that numerous studies have shown
 that the relative unemployment rates in Ireland
 and the United Kingdom are important in
 determining the flow of Irish workers to, and
 back from, the United Kingdom. Smyth
 hypothesizes that the higher the Irish unemploy-
 ment rate relative to that of the UK (UI-UKt),
 the higher will be the level of migration out of
 the Irish work-force and the greater the drag
 exerted on Irish union growth.
 One obvious reason why the level of, or rate
 of change in, unemployment per se is found to
 have no significant effect on the rate of trade
 union growth in Ireland may be that measured
 unemployment is a poor indicator of labour
 market slackness due to migration flows.
 Looked at in this sense, Smyth's variable,
 UI-UKt, can be seen to represent a measure of
 the level of unemployment in Ireland adjusted
 for the 'migratory pull' exerted by UK economic
 conditions. Irrespective of whether the con-
 strained migration flows of the War years are
 included or excluded, our results indicate that
 UI-UKt has no significant effect on the rate of
 trade union growth in a model estimated over
 th  period beginning in 1932-the first year for
 which a value of this variable can be derived
(equations 4.1 and 4.2 of Table 4).29 Nor does
 UI-UKt attain significance when added to our
 preferred model estimated over the period
 1946-77. Negative results are also obtained
 when UI-UKt is replaced by a variable measur-
 ing migration flows directly (MIGt) (equations
 4.3 and 4.4).30 It must be concluded, therefore,
 that Smyth's results, like those of Sapsford, are
 the outcome of poor data and a mis-specified
 model.31
 Given the failure of measures of migration to
 account for the absence of a significant re-
 lationship betwee  unemployment and the rate
 of union growth, it is important to consider
 alternative possibilities. An examination of a
 scatterplot of unemployment and the rate of
 union growth indicated clearly that the result
could not be accounted for by 'outliers' or
 exceptional annual values. Nor are any non-
 linear patterns apparent that would suggest a
 more complex relationship between the vari-
 ables than the simple linear and concurrent
 relationship posited in the Bain-Elsheikh
 model. The first problem that arises is that even
 if we attempt, as above, to correct for migration
 flow into and out of the Irish work-force by
 introducing an explicit migration term, the
 migration data-notoriously problematic in the
 Irish case-include (variable) numbers of
 spouses and dependants of working migrants.
 Second, variations in labour market buoyancy
 are known to have a strong pro-cyclical effect on
 numbers entering the live register: a rise in the
 demand for labour has tended, at least in some
 periods, to raise the supply at a higher rate than
 unemployment has declined. So in the Irish case
 employment can increase in any year without a
 corresponding fall in unemployment. These
 factors indicate that the measured rate of unem-
 ployment in Ireland is a poor indicator of vari-
 ations in opportunity to unionize. However,
 there is also a reason for suggesting that it is also
 a poor indicator of variations in propensity to
 unionize. Bain and Elsheikh (1976: 65-66) sug-
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 TABLE 4 Trade union growth in Ireland, 1930-1984: real wages, relative unemployment and migration effects
 Equation 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
 Period 1932-84 193284(a) 1930-84 1930-84(a)
 Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
 R2 0-8342* 0.7892* 0-7901* 0.7202*
 F 32-3485 24-9533 25-2275 18-0147
 DW 2-21t 2.12t 1.91t 1-85t
 Constant 7-0795* 6-5688* 5-8287* 4.7428*
 (6-057) (4-364) (4-766) (3-164)
 AWt 0-3000* 0-2195* 0-3065* 0-2475
 (3-142) (2-354) (2-767) (2-180)
 DEt-1 -0-1597* -0-1465* -0-1463* -0 1202*
 (-4.777) (-3-360) (-4.071) (-2-292)
 AEt 0.8510* 1-0481* 0-8471* 1.0019*
 (5-762) (5-869) (5.487) (5-260)
 APt -0-1555 -0-1131 -0-0990 -0-0852
 (-1-873) (-1-228) (-1.125) (-0-838)
 WSt - 15.8698* -15.4464*
 (-7-014) (-6.124)
 T 3-7710* 3-7103* 4.2276* 4.3669*
 (3-923) (3-677) (4.073) (4-224)
 UI-UKt 0-0773 0-12439
 (0-878) (1-127)
 MIGt 0-0243 0-0281
 (0-871) (1.045)
 Note: (a) Excluding 1939-45.
 gested that the rate of unemployment coloured
 employees' disposition towards unionization; in
 times of high unemployment people were deter-
 red from joining unions by fear of employer
 hostility and a sense of general union ineffec-
 tiveness. The Irish rate of unemployment prob-
 ably had little subjective effect on employees.
 Table 5 presents data on the average levels and
 variability of unemployment in the nations
 studied by Bain and Elsheikh and in Ireland.
 The measures of central tendency and variability
 are calculated over the periods covered by Bain
 and Elsheikh's regressions and over the period
 1932-84 in the case of Ireland. The most salient
 feature of the data is the fact that both mean and
 median levels of unemployment in Ireland are
 significantly higher than in any other country,
 while the variability of unemployment is lower.
 Given that Ireland is characterized by relatively
 high average unemployment and low unemploy-
 ment variability, it seems reasonable to suggest
 that employees and employers may have
 become som what inured to prevailing rates of
 unemployment, with a concomitant decline in
 the deterrence effect of unemployment implied
 by Bain and Elsheikh. In short, part of the
 influence un mployment might be expected to
 exert on the r te of union growth may have been
 neutralized in the Irish situation owing to an
 'inurement effect' arising out of the peculiarities
 of Ireland's unemployment problem.
 THE NEUTRAL EFFECT OF BARGAINING
 STRUCTURE, POLITICS AND
 INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT
 The institutional character of wage bargaining
 The system of age bargaining in Ireland since
 the Second World War has been characterized
 by a ell-developed pattern of inclusive wage
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 TABLE 5 The level and variability of unemployment in Ireland and in nations studied by Bain and Elsheikh(a)
 Standard
 Period Mean Median deviation Variance
 Ireland 1932-1984 9.7 8-8 3-6 12-9
 United Kingdom 1882-1970 5-6 3-1 5-3 28-5
 United States 1897-1970 6-9 5-0 5-5 30-7
 Australia 1907-1969 4-7 3-4 4-3 18-4
 Sweden 1914-1970 7-2 4-6 6-5 42-1
 Sources: Data in Bain and Elsheikh (1976) Appendix E; Irish sources outlined in Appendix 1.
 Note: (a) Measures of central tendency and variability are calculated in the table for the periods over which union growth
 models have been estimated.
 rounds. In periods when rounds were under way
 the bargaining activity of unions in different
 sectors of the labour market was highly syn-
 chronized. Given the institutional importance of
 the round system in Irish wage bargaining, it
 seems worthwhile to test whether the incidence
 of rounds per se may have exerted an influence
 on trade union growth, irrespective of the levels
 of pay increases unions were negotiating.
 Several dummy variables were used to test for
 a distinct institutional wage round effect on Irish
 trade union growth (for details see Roche and
 Larragy, 1989: 44). The results suggested that
 the wage round system exerted no distinct insti-
 tutional effect on union growth, separable from
 the effect of wage rises. When a simple wage
 round dummy R is introduced into a model
 which includes a wage term (equation 6.3 of
 Table 6), neither term attains significance at the
 chosen level. Of some interest, however, are the
 results obtained when R is substituted for the
 wage term (equation 6.4). The dummy just fails
 to attain significance at the 99 per cent level,
 though it is significant at the 95 per cent level;
 but its standardized regression coefficient (beta)
 at 0-31 is not much smaller than the standardized
 coefficients obtained on the wage term in
 different models.32 This suggests that the mag-
 nitude of the wage rises achieved in rounds are
 not a great deal more consistent or important
 than the simple occurrence of rounds in their
 effect on trade union growth. In other words,
 the fact that a round occurred was almost as
 significant as the magnitude of the wage rises
achieved in the round. This points to the occur-
 rence in Ireland of a more generalized and more
 i stitutionally rooted 'credit effect' of wage rises
 on union growth than that originally postulated
 by Bain and Elsheikh.
 The level of wage bargaining
 As indicated above, wage rounds since the War
 occurred through collective bargaining at a
 decentralized level and at national level. An
 argument could be advanced why national wage
 agreements might be expected to have exerted a
 drag on union membership. National pay agree-
 ments, if strictly adhered to by unions, seem
 likely to intensify the 'free rider problem' which
 they inevitably face in delivering 'public goods'
 such as wage rises or improvements in social and
 economic policy. In periods when national wage
 agreements are in operation, pay bargaining
 may be taken out of the hands of officials at local
 level, with a consequent reduction in union and
 peer pressure on employees to join, or remain
 in, unions. As a result, union recruitment may
 suffer in spite of the greater national promi-
 nence that unions might otherwise enjoy.33 If on
 the other hand, there is extensive evasion of
 national norms through supplementary bargain-
 ing and wage drift at lower levels of bargaining,
 the free rider problem may be countervailed and
 neutralized and the existence of a national wage
 bargaining system may have a negligible effect
 on union growth. While few data are available
 on the extent of supplementary bargaining
 under Irish national wage agreements, there are
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 TABLE 6 Trade union growth in Ireland, 1930-1984: Profits and the institutional character of wage bargaining
 Equation 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4
 Period 1943-84 1943-84 1930-84 1930-84
 Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
 R2 0-8017* 0-8025* 0-7966* 0-7806*
 F 23-5800 23-7032 26-2839 28-4599
 DW 2-22t 2.22t 1-91t 1.91t
 Constant 9-3245* 9-3686* 6-9676* 6-5049*
 (4-669) (4-715) (5-300) (4-898)
 AWt 0-2451 0-2436* 0-2105*
 (0-823) (2-480) (2-473)
 DEt-l -0-1954* -0-1970* -0-1825* -0-1674*
 (-4-340) (-4-383) (-4-020) (-3-644)
 AEt 0-74322* 0-7377* 0-8928* 1-0384*
 (4-571) (4-529) (5-710) (7-390)
 APt -0-1000 -0-0712 -0-0478 0-0803
 (-1-059) (-0-687) (-0-515) (1-213)
 WSt - 156834* - 16.2550*
 (-6-358) (-6-461)
 T 3-5245* 3-5222* 3-3397* 3-2242*
 (3-648) (3-654) (2-696) (2-536)
 AIIt 0-0238
 (0-823)
 A(IIfP)t 0-0291
 (0-910)
 R 2-0875 3-0783
 (1-504) (2-325)
 indications that it was extensive-at any rate,
 under the 1970s 'generation' of national wage
 deals.34
 Conceptual problems arise in testing for a
 bargaining structure effect on Irish trade union
 growth and these are outlined elsewhere (Roche
 and Larragy, 1989: 47). Several dummies were
 tried but all results were negative. Equation 7.1
 of Table 7 presents the results obtained when a
 dummy (Nat) is included which covers all
 national agreements since 1945. The coefficient
 on Nat is negative but statistically insignificant.35
 It can be concluded then that the level at which
 pay bargaining formally occurred in Ireland has
 had a negligible influence on trade union
 growth. This can be attributed to the fact that
 national deals in the period up to 1970 often did
 little more than set down a broad framework for
 local negotiations, and that in the period 1970-
 81 there was extensive evasion of national wage
 norms.
The political composition of government
 Several studies of trade union growth have
 in estigated whether the political composition of
 parliaments or governments has affected trade
 union growth (Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 1969;
 Schnabel, 1987; Armingeon, 1988; Carruth and
 Disney, 1988). The degree to which the
 complexion of government influences union
 growth will depend for the most part on the
 character of the political cleavages that dis-
 tinguish the party systems of different nations.
 This being so, there are good reasons to expect
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 TABLE 7 Trade union growth in Ireland, 1930-1984: The level of wage bargaining, political composition of
 government and workers involved in strike activity
 Equation 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4
 Period 1930-84 1930-84 1930-84 1930-84
 OLS
 Standardized
 coefficients
 Method OLS OLS OLS (beta)
 R2 0-7930* 0-7871* 0-7899*
 F 25-7235 24-8200 25-2352
 DW 1-85+ 1-83+ 1-80+
 Constant 5-7638* 6-0970* 6.2377*
 (4-762) (5-071) (5-165)
 AWt 0-2922* 0-2691* 0-2640* 0-2650
 (2-807) (2-572) (2-541)
 DEt-1 -0 -1264* -0 1380* -0 1497* -0-4187
 (-3.603) (-3-969) (-3-983)
 AEt 0-8336* 0-8408* 0-7971* 0-4525
 (5-471) (5-330) (5-010)
 APt -0-1000 -0-0990 -0-1121
 (-1-059) (-1-117) (-1-250)
 WSt -15-7072* - 15-4049* - 15-5580* -0-4593
 (-6-314) (-6-196) (-6-192)
 T 4-9574* 4-4049* 4-4684* 0-3291
 (4-615) (4-260) (4-464)
 Nat -0-9985
 (-1.194)
 Pol 0-2317
 (0-276)
 Wit 2-7380
 (0-834)
 that the composition of Irish governments will
 have no significant effect on unionization. For
 what has characterized the politics of industrial
 relations in Ireland is the absence of any signifi-
 cant divergence in the policies of the major
 political parties on unions and collective
 bargaining. It is possible to identify differences
 of emphasis and priority, but industrial relations
 issues have not been politicized by the major
 parties to the degree that has obtained in party
 systems where the main cleavage has developed
 around 'class politics'. While a case could be
 made that the Irish Labour Party has followed a
 distinct and class-focused policy on industrial
 relations matters, the fact that Labour has
 entered government only as a minor coalition
 partner has meant that in practice it has had to
 operate within, or in tension with, lines of policy
 pursued by one of the major parties. Two
 'political effect' dummies were tested in our
 preferred model. The first was assigned a value
 of unity for years in which the Labour Party
 participated in coalition governments and in the
 case of the year 1932 when Labour supported a
 minority Fianna Fail government; the second
 was assigned a value of unity for years in which
 these governments had been in power for more
 than six months. The results were similar in both
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 cases: there is no evidence of a party-political
 influence on trade union growth and decline in
 Ireland. The results on the first dummy (Pol) are
 presented in equation 7.2; the sign on Pol is
 positive but the coefficient is very insignificant.
 Strike activity
 Union membership might be expected to rise
 during strike waves for several reasons. First,
 high levels of strike activity may reflect extensive
 worker dissatisfaction with a complex of indus-
 trial relations issues and growing assertiveness
 or militancy, which may find expression in
 higher levels of unionization. Second, strike
 waves may on balance foster attachment to
 unions through their often observed effect on
 building solidarity and through their concur-
 rence with union campaigns and pressure at
 workplace level. Finally, it has been suggested
 that increasing industrial conflict may induce
 employees to join unions in order to receive
 strike pay. It has to be recognized, on the other
 hand, that increased strike activity may not
 always act as a stimulus to union growth. Large
 and/or prolonged strikes that collapse in defeat
 for unions have been known to lead to serious
 membership losses. Such strikes are the excep-
 tion rather than the rule, however, as in most
 instances of strike action no clear 'winner' is
 evident and the other concomitants of strike
 action probably work to the advantage of
 unions. It might be hypothesized then the level
 of strike activity will be positively related to
 union growth.
 It is still open whether workers involved or
 working days lost represents the best indicator
 of the level of strike activity as it affects trade
 union growth. The number of workers involved
 in strikes each year seems preferable in that it
 measures the annual incidence of worker experi-
 ence of strike activity. Working days lost should
 nonetheless be examined as well in that it is a
 more parsimonious indicator of the overall
 volume of strike activity. Irrespective of the
 indicator used (equation 7.3 presents the results
 when worker involvement, WIt, is introduced
 into the model), the results fail to confirm the
 hypothesis and strike activity is revealed as
 having no significant effect on Irish trade union
 growth.
 CONCLUSION
 This paper has presented a detailed examination
 of the cyclical and institutional determinants of
 an ual trade union growth and decline in
 Ireland. The paper has tried to account for some
 of the puzzling and negative results obtained
 when the Bain-Elsheikh and other business
 cycle models are fitted to Irish data. It emerges
 that the 'peculiarities' of the Irish labour market
 and of the institutional structure of Irish indus-
 trial relations present a severe test to models
 developed to address the more orthodox labour
 markets of more developed industrial nations.
 In politics, too, Ireland is distinctive: the
 absence of a major cleavage in the manner in
 which the main parties have approached the
 politics of industrial relations means that no
 significant political influence on trade union
 growth has been apparent since 1930.
 The alternative model of Irish trade union
 growth developed in this paper is estimated
 finally with all insignificant variables excluded in
 equation 7.4 of Table 7. The model can be
 summarized as follows:
 AMt = P+ + flAWt + -2WSt + 33AEt + 4T +
 PsDEt-1 + Et (2)
 Where AWt = the rate of change in earnings;
 WSt is a dummy variable included to take
 account of the introduction of a wages standstill
in 1941 (1941 = 1, all other years = 0); AEt =
 the rate of change in civilian employees at work;
 T = a dummy variable included to allow for a
 post-war 'transition effect' on union growth
 (1946-52 = 1, all other years = 0); DEt_l = the
 level of employment density lagged one year + et
 is a random error term.
 In this model the expected signs on the co-
efficients are:
 P1, 33, p4>0 and 32, P5<0.
 NOTES
 1. It is postulated that the rate of change in unemploy-
 ment, AUt may also affect growth even if no significant
 effect is exerted by the level of unemployment Ut. It is
 also thought possible that Ut and APt may operate one-
 or two-year lags. The possibility of a non-linear effect in
 the case of union density is also considered, as is the
 possibility that the effect of prices on union growth may
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 be moderated at higher levels of inflation (Bain and
 Elsheikh, 1976: 68-71).
 2. Autocorrelated residuals render tests of significance
 unreliable and can affect parameter estimates and R2s.
 The problem of autocorrelation in time series and the
 Cochrane-Orcutt procedure are discussed in Ostrom
 (1978: 20-41).
 3. The usual tests indicate that this finding cannot be
 accounted for by multicollinearity between wages and
 prices, though the zero-order correlation between these
 variables is nevertheless high, r = 0-72. (On the prob-
 lem of multicollinearity, see Lewis-Beck, 1980: 58-63.)
 4. In all the countries examined by Bain and Elsheikh,
 zero-order correlations between the rate of price in-
 flation and the level of unemployment are negative. In
 the Irish case, however, a positive coefficient (r = 0.225)
 is obtained.
 5. As we saw, Bain and Elsheikh seek to allow for the
 impact on union membership of changes in 'potential
 membership' by means of a lagged density term (Dt-1).
 In deciding against the inclusion of an explicit potential
 membership term, Bain and Elsheikh departed from the
 practice adopted in earlier econometric research
 (Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 1969; Sharpe, 1971). Their
 primary reason for omitting a term allowing directly for
 the impact on union growth of variations in potential
 union membership seems to have been that their British
 labour force data before 1948 were derived by means of
 linear interpolation of decennial Census of Population
 data, with the result that a variable constructed from
 them would exhibit little year-to-year variation (Bain
 and Elsheikh, 1976: 67-68). In the Irish case we were
 able to derive a more reliable indicator of annual
 changes in the employee work-force than could be
 obtained by linear interpolation (see Appendix 1). Bain
 and Elsheikh (1976: 37-39) also underscore Mancke's
 well-known criticism of Ashenfelter and Pencavel's use
 of potential membership as a regressor.
 In essence the argument is that the coefficient on such
 a term can be of little interest in that it is almost
 definitional that a change in potential membership,
 ceteris paribus, will lead to an equal proportional change
 in union membership. This argument, however, should
 not be accepted uncritically, particularly in the Irish
 case. First of all, as has been argued, the omission of
 such a term might result in other terms proxying effects
 other than those they were included to measure, leading
 to biassed coefficients and spurious results. Second, the
 coefficient on the potential membership term might
 range from below to above unity-the coefficient
 implied by Mancke's criticism-producing interpretable
 and possibly important results.
 Finally, where we have reason to believe that the
 measured rate of unemployment is a poor indicator of
 labour market slackness, a potential membership term
 might be expected to pick up more directly the postu-
 lated effect of variations in the labour market on union
 growth.
 6. The possibility of non-linear relationships between
 density and the rate of union growth was examined in
 detail. On theoretical grounds and following earlier
 research, we tested inverse and quadratic functional
 forms of the density variable (see Roche and Larragy,
 1989: 56-57). The results suggested that the linear form
 reported here was preferable.
 7. An F test con ucted on model 2.2 when one additional
 case (1932) was added confirmed that it was unstable (in
 effect, due to the instability of APt). The calculated F
 ratio was 8-0, compared with a theoretical F at the 99
 per cent level of 3-07. A further test conducted on the
 same model, but excluding the insignificant Ut term,
 when three additional cases were added (1930-32) also
 pointed to instability: giving a calculated F of 5-5,
 compared with a theoretical F of 3-22. (For details of the
 usages of F tests, see Kamenta, 1971.)
 8. A plot of the standardized residuals of equation 2.3 of
 Table 2 reveals that during these years the model on
 average mispredicts (in fact, by over-predicting) the rate
 of trade union growth by a greater degree than during
 any other period.
 9  The use of AWFt as a measure of changes in potential
 membership will not have the same effect on the ex-
 planatory significance of the price term because it
 cannot track variations in labour market slackness as
 directly as AEt.
 10. The strong emphasis of union wage policy on the
 restoration of pre-war living standards is outlined in
 O'Mahony (1965).
 11. While this is clearly inconvenient for econometric
 methodology, it seems to us to call into question Bain
 and Elsheikh's dismissal (op. cit., pp. 11-25) of attempts
 to allow for economic and social convolution in theories
 of trade union growth. It is worth noting in this regard
 that the nations to which the theory was applied in
 Union Growth and the Business Cycle, Britain, the
USA, Australia and Sweden, are all countries
 characterized by relatively stable economic and social
 development during the late nineteenth and twentieth
 centuries.
 12. It should be noted that when 1951 or 1950 are used as
 termination years, AWt fails to attain significance at the
 95 per cent level.
 13. The calculated F ratio obtained from a comparison of
 equations 2.4 and 3.1 is 64-9, and this greatly exceeds
 t e theoretical F value of 7-19 at the 99 per cent level of
 probability. It can be suggested that the three factors we
 believe to have given rise to a transition effect followed,
 so to speak, different 'trajectories of decay'. This
 renders it difficult to select a formal decay function that
 might best model the attenuation of the transition
 effect. (For a discussion of this issue, see Roche and
 Larragy, 1989: 24.)
 14. Indeed, the competitiveness of Irish exports on the UK
 market increased sharply during this period (see
 Conniffe and Kennedy, 1984: Ch. 6).
 15. In both countries the 1977 retail price index was just
 under double its pre-oil crisis 1973 level.
 16. McAleese and Martin (1973: 45) draw attention to the
 'exceedingly high' effective tariff protection enjoyed by
 Irish manufacturers. While the greater part of Irish
 import trade with the UK consisted of trade in manufac-
 tured goods and raw materials, the major proportion of
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 Irish exports to the UK since the foundation of the State
 was accounted for by trade in livestock and food. (See
 Kennedy, 1971: 31-32.)
 17. Research evidence concerning the unresponsiveness of
 Irish management to labour practices over the greater
 part of the period which concerns us can be found in the
 studies of 22 industries conducted during the 1960s by
 the Committee on Industrial Organization (CIO). As
 well as identifying a general lack of concern for competi-
 tiveness in Irish business, the CIO (Industry Reports,
 various years; 1965) repeatedly drew attention to what it
 saw as management acquiescence in 'seriously in-
 efficient' labour practices. See also the 1960s Irish
 Management Institute survey of management (Tomlin,
 1966).
 18. Sapsford (1984: 313) points out that he experimented
 with measures of competitiveness in his regressions
 covering the period 1943-77, and that the results sug-
 gested that relative price trends had a significant influ-
 ence on union growth.
 19. From 1932 to 1984 the UK share of total Irish trade fell
 from over 80 per cent to just under 40 per cent.
 Regrettably, there is no consistent means of identifying
 the changing UK share of Irish trade in manufactured
 goods over this period.
 20. While the ratio of Irish to British inflation-measured as
 a ratio of absolute annual changes in index points or in
 proportionate terms-might seem the simplest measure
 of relative price trends, it has the disadvantage that for
 years when either Irish or British prices remained
 unchanged, it is not possible to calculate values.
 21. The mean Irish unemployment rate over this period was
 10 per cent, and the median rate was 8-9 per cent.
 22. Given that the mean and median unemployment rates
 are practically the same, the results are similar
 regardless of which measure is used to distinguish
 between inflationary and stagflationary price rises.
 Similar results are obtained when the mean and median
 of AEt (1930-84) are used to define inflationary and
 stagflationary price terms.
 23. Following Bain and Elsheikh, we tested for the possi-
 bility that inflation might be related to union growth in a
 non-linear manner, such that higher rates of inflation
 exert a smaller or greater impact on union growth than
 lower rates. The results, however, were negative.
 24. It could be argued that the features of wage determi-
 nation that we have described imply that Irish
 employees have focused their wage bargaining activity
 on real wages, with the result that any 'credit effect'
 enjoyed by unions has depended on trends in real rather
 than money wages. The results obtained when real wage
 variables are introduced into the preferred model fail to
 provide support for this hypothesis. Neither A(W/P)t or
 AW-APt attain significance at the 95 per cent level. The
 results obtained when A(W/P)t is introduced into the
 model suggested that union growth has benefited from a
 degree of 'money illusion' or perhaps from the fact that
 wage rises have proved more salient to some employees
 than price rises. It should be noted that when an F test is
 applied to a linear restriction imposed on money wage
 trends and inflation, the restriction is rejected at the 95
 per cen  level bu  cannot be rejected at the 99 per cent
 level. Similar r sults are obtained for A(W/P)t and
 AW-APt.
 25. This expla ation is not entirely satisfactory, however.
 While it is certainly plausible that trade union members
 may have becom  accustomed to such an expectation,
 wi  the result that, other things being equal, they were
 no more likely to remain union members in times of high
 in lation than at other times, the bearing of this
 hypothesis on the propensity of potential members to
 joi  unions appears a good deal more remote. The
 hypothe is may reasonably be extended-though some-
 what tenuously-to the behaviour of potential trade
 union members employed in industries covered by
 unionized bargaining units. It becomes plausible in
 other industries only if it can be assumed that pay rises
 here too were transparently influenced by trends in the
 cost of living. This seems unlikely but, in any event,
 cannot be assessed empirically due to the paucity of
 studies of sectoral developments in Irish industrial
 relations.
 26. In a later analysis of union growth in the UK, Bain and
 Elsheikh found that the rate of change in real profits had
 a significant effect on union growth over the period for
 which data were available (1893-1913 and 1920-65),
 without altering appreciably the explanatory signifi-
 cance of other terms in their model (see Elsheikh and
 Bain, 1979).
 27. Sapsford and Smyth's specification of profits variables in
 levels rather than rates of change, however, is open to
 serious question. Both their money and real profits
 levels are derived from the national accounts and trend
 sharply upwards over the period in question in response
 to growth in the capital base of the Irish economy. As
 such, profits level variables of this kind are in major part
 measuring such a time trend rather than the cyclical
 'prosperity effect' intended. Thus, it is best to follow
 Bain and Elsheikh by using a rate of change variable to
 specify variations in profitability.
 28. When (an index of) the level of real profits is used as a
 regressor over the period 1943-77 it attains significance
 at the 95 per cent level and the price term in the
 equation also attains significance at the same level.
 However, these results seem to be affected by multi-
 collinearity caused by the introduction of the real profits
 term II/Pt. II/Pt is highly correlated with APt (r = 0-718),
 with DEt-t (r = 0.791) and also with AWt (r = 0.671).
 Each of these variables is significantly less highly
 correlated with the dependent variable, AMt. Consistent
 with these results, the significance of IIt is affected by
 the exclusion of APt and DEt-t from the estimating
 equation. Neither Sapsford nor Smyth appear to have
 considered the possibility that the results obtained when
 II/Pt was introduced into their models were seriously
 affected by multicollinearity.
 29. For a discussion of the issue of wartime migration and of
 the manner in which it was regarded by Smyth, see
 Roche and Larragy (1989: 39-40).
 30. It might be thought better on theoretical grounds to
 include a domestic unemployment term in models incor-
 porating either UI-UKt or MIGt to separate out the
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 effects of domestic unemployment and migration. How-
 ever, further regressions indicated that the results are
 not affected by the inclusion of a domestic unemploy-
 ment term. Nor are they affected by applying one-year
 lags to UI-UKt or MIGt.
 31. In the light of Smyth's results we tested for the possi-
 bility of a structural break in the regime generating
 union growth at the outset of the War and after the War.
 However, Chow tests for structural breaks in 1939 and
 1946 in our preferred model with the addition of
 UI-UKt were negative.
 32. The beta values on AWt in alternative models tend to
 fall in the range 0-36-0-37.
 33. For a fuller development of this theme, see Roche and
 Larragy (1989: 46-7).
 34. A review of national wage bargaining in Ireland during
 that decade, commissioned by the Federated Union of
 Employers, concluded that supplementary bargaining
 was sufficiently widespread to have constituted a second
 tier of pay bargaining (Fogarty et al., 1981). The case
 load of the Labour Court also increased dramatically
 during the 1970s, partly in response to union claims
 relating to the anomaly and productivity provisions of
 successive agreements.
 35. When a dummy confined to the 1970's generation of
 national agreements is tested, it retains a negative sign
 but is even more insignificant.
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 APPENDIX
 Data Sources and Variable Definitions
 All rate of change variables were defined in the following
 manner:
 AXt = Xt- Xt-i
 Xt-1
 INTERVAL LEVEL VARIABLES
 Trade Union Membership (M)
 Data series constructed in accordance with the principles
 outlined in detail in W. K. Roche and J. Larragy, 'The
 Determinants of Annual Trade Union Growth and Decline
 in the Irish Republic: Evidence from the DUES Member-
 ship Series', DUES Working Papers, Department of Indus-
 trial Relations, University College Dublin and University of
 Mannheim, Federal Republic of Germany. The DUES
 Series on Trade Union Membership in Ireland will be
 published in J. Visser and B. Ebbinghaus, eds., The Devel-
 opment of Trade Unions in Western European Societies: Data
 Handbook, Vol. 1 (forthcoming).
 Trade Union Density (DE and DWF)
 Measured as M/E or M/WF, where E denotes the estimated
 number of civilian employees at work (see below) and WF
 denotes E plus numbers unemployed (see below).
 Civilian Employees at Work (E)
 A variety of sources and methods were used to derive
 estimates of E and thus of AE. Again a detailed discussion of
 how the series was constructed will be found in Roche and
 Larragy, op. cit. The principles applied in developing the
 employees at work series are outlined below. From these
 estimates were subtracted data on numbers in the Gardai
 and defence forces. Data on numbers of personnel in the
 permanent defence forces were obtained from The Statistical
 Abstract (1930-1939), the Department of Defence (1945-
 1984) and a variety of other sources (1940-44), principally,
 Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of
 Neutrality 1939-45 (London, Paladin, 1985). Data on the
 strength of the Gardai were obtained from The Department
 of Justice (1939-1984) and The Statistical Abstract (1930-38).
 (i) Total employees at work 1930-1946: For the period
 1930-1950, national health insurance contribution data on
 employment levels were used as a trend indicator for interp-
 olating and extrapolating data on employment contained in
 the population censuses of 1936 and 1946. While such data
 represent the most comprehensive source of information on
 the yearly trend in employment during this period, estimates
 must be treated with caution, given that the coverage of the
 national health insurance scheme was far from universal.
 NHI data were published in The Trend of Employment and
 Unemployment (Dublin, Department of Industry and
 Commerce).
 (ii) Total employees at work 1947-71: Estimates for 1951-70
 are taken from G. Hughes, The Functional Distribution of
 Income in Ireland, 1938-1970 (Dublin, ESRI, 1973), Table
 A 6. Estimates for the periods 1947-50 and 1967-71 were
 derived by applying the method of trend interpolation
 outlined in Hughes, op. cit.
 (iii) Total employees at work 1972-84: Derived from
 Employment and Unemployment 1984 (Brussels, Eurostat,
 1984) updated from unpublished data made available by the
 Central Statistics Office.
 Unemployment (U)
 Data on annual average numbers on the live register (1932-
 84), expressed as a percentage rate of the total civilian
 employee workforce, defined as civilian employees at work
 (E), plus the live register totals. The data were obtained
 from t e live register tables in The Trend of Employment
 and Unemployment.
 Data on unemployment in the United Kingdom were
 obtained from Bain and Elsheikh, Union Growth and the
 Business Cycle, Appendix E, Table E.1, updated by data in
 G. S. Bain and R. Price, 'Union Growth in Britain: Retro-
 spect and Prospect', British Journal of Industrial Relations,
 21, 1983, Table 7.
 The Employee Workforce (WF)
 This was defined as E plus totals on the live register.
 Wages (W)
 The earnings series was constructed of necessity from several
sources. For the period 1931-39 the only wage series avail-
 able covered rates per hour paid to wage earners in 23
 industrial occupations. As the hours of work of those
 covered by this early survey did not change to any significant
 degree over the period, the data are a reasonable indicator
 of weekly rates. Problems arise, however, in using these data
 and in regard to their consistency with the data on earnings
 used for the remainder of the period covered by the study.
 First of all, the wage rates related, in the words of the
 survey, to the 'beginning of the year'. As such, it seemed
 advisable to regard the index rate given for each year as
 more properly pertaining to the previous year. This pro-
 cedure was followed in assigning values to the years 1931-39.
 Second, it might be questioned whether these data on wage
 rates are consistent with data for the period from 1940 on
 earnings. Given the under-developed state of collective
 bargaining during the 1930s and the dominance of industry-
 level and district bargaining structures in the period before
 the Second World War, it seems reasonable to assume that
 wage rate data is an acceptable measure of the trend in
 earnings and that no major inconsistency is introduced into
 the series on this account. The wage rate series was taken
 from Some Statistics of Wages and Hours of Work in 1937
 with Comparative Figures for Certain Previous Years,
 Dublin, Department of Industry and Commerce, P. No.
 2904, 1938. For 1930 we had to rely on secondary sources for
 an indication of wage trends. On the basis of an economic
 commentary which indicated that wages had not changed to
 any significant degree in the Dublin areas during 1930, a
 value of 0 was assigned to AWt for that year. See Report of
 the Commission on Banking, Currency and Credit, Dublin,
 Stationery Office, 1938.
 For the period 1940-49 data were available on the 'total
 weekly earnings per wage earner' of wage earners in 'certain
 industries producing transportable goods'. It was estimated
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 that these industries accounted for approximately 80 per
 cent of employment in the production of transportable
 goods. An index was derived from these wage data by
 averaging values in the March and September censuses,
 reported in The Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin.
 (A commentary on the series appears in the March 1943
 edition of the ITJSB, p. 11.) Data for the period 1950-84 are
 based on averaging earnings reported in the quarterly
 inquiries of all industries producing transportable goods.
 The data are reported in the ITJSB and The Irish Statistical
 Bulletin.
 Retail Prices (P)
 The prices series used in this study were obtained by linking
 together the cost of living index (1930-47), 'interim cost of
 living index' (1947-52) and consumer price index (1953-84).
 The data were obtained from The Irish Trade Journal and
 Statistical Bulletin and The Irish Statistical Bulletin.
 Indicators of Competitiveness (C)
 Data on Irish retail price trends were obtained as outlined
 above. Data on retail prices in the United Kingdom were
 obtained from Bain and Elsheikh, Union Growth and the
 Business Cycle, Appendix E, Table E.1, updated from data
 in G. S. Bain and R. Price, 'Union Growth in Britain:
 Retrospect and Prospect', Table 7, and ILO International
 Year Book of Labour Statistics (Geneva, ILO, 1986), p. 380,
 Table 23. Data on the United Kingdom share of Irish trade
 were derived by using data on the value at current prices of
 Irish exports to, and imports from, Great Britain and
 Northern Ireland (source: The Statistical Abstract). These
 data were obtained for five-year time-points from 1930 and
 values for intervening years were derived through linear
 interpolation. The resulting factors were used as weights on
 relative price trends. Data on exchange rates of the punt
 relative to sterling, used to weight the relative price variables
 to take account of exchange rate variations, relate to annual
 average exchange rates and are published in The Annual
 Report of the Central Bank of Ireland, Dublin.
 Profits
 Data for the years 1944 to 1984 cover the 'trading profits of
 companies (including corporate bodies) before tax',
 obtained from the Irish Statistical Bulletin and National
 Income and Expenditure (Dublin, Central Statistics Office).
 The value for 1943 was derived as the predicted value from a
 linear regression of 'trading profits' on corporation tax
 returns published in Reports of the Revenue Commissioners
 (Dublin, Central Statistics Office).
 Migration (MIG)
 Estimates of 'net migration' for the period 1930 to 1975 were
 obtained from J. G. Hughes, Estimates of Annual Net
 Migration and their Relationship with Series on Annual Net
 Passenger Movement: Ireland 1926-76 (Dublin, Economic
 and Social Research Institute, Memorandum Series, August
 1977). Estimat s for the period 1976 to 1984 were predicted
 values obtained from a linear regression of estimated migra-
 tion (1943-74) on net annual passenger movements. Data on
 annual passenger movements were obtained from Hughes,
 op. it. and The Statistical Abstract of Ireland.
 Strike activity (WI and variants)
Data on work s involved in strikes and on working days lost
 due to strikes between 1930 and 1979 were obtained from
 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Industrial
 Relations (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1981), Appendix 5,
 Table 3. Data for the remainder of the period were obtained
 from The Irish Statistical Bulletin.
 DUMMY VARIABLES
 Transition effect (T)
 A detailed account of the construction of this variable is
 found in the text.
 Th  institutional character of wage bargaining
 (R and variants)
 Scoring on the reported simple wage-round incidence
 dummy:
 Zero
 1930-45; 1953-54; 1963; 1965
 One
 1946-52; 1955-62; 1964;
 1966-84
 The main sources used for information on wage rounds
 were David O'Mahony, Economic Aspects of Industrial
 Relations, Dublin, ESRI Paper No. 24, 1965; W. E. J.
 McCarthy, et al., Wage Inflation and Wage Leadership,
 Dublin, ESRI Paper No. 79, 1975; J. O'Brien, A Study of
 Na ional Wage Agreements in Ireland, Dublin, ESRI
 R earch Paper No. 104, 1981; Industrial Relations News
 Report, published in Dublin by Industrial Relations News.
 The level of wage bargaining (N and variants)
 Scoring on the reported national wage agreement dummy:
 Zero
 1930-47; 1953-56; 1959-63;
 1965; 1968-69; 1981-84
 One
 1948-52; 1957-58; 1964;
 1966-67; 1970-80
 The sources are those reported above.
 The political composition of Government (Pol and variants)
 Sco ing on the reported political dummy:
 Zero
 1930-31; 1933-7; 1957-72;
 1977-1980
 One
 1932; 1948-56; 1973-76;
 1981-84
The sources used were P. Flora et al., State, Economy and
 Society in Western Europe 1815-1975: A Data Handbook,
 L ndon, Campus Macmillan, 1983; The Magill Book of Irish
 Politics, Dublin, Magill Publications.
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